Abstract
Introduction
The British legal system is dualist in nature. Compared to monist systems, such as Germany's, international treaties and conventions to which Britain is a signatory are not automatically part of British law. In Germany, once an international treaty or convention has been signed it has priority in Germany law. In Britain, it is only when they have come before Parliament as a bill or part of a bill that are they incorporated into domestic law. Two of the most important Conventions relating to refugees and We begin with a brief outline of the situation in Britain prior to 1993 and the role of the 1951 Convention before it became part of British domestic law. We then move on to consider its impact post-incorporation. This is followed by a consideration of the role of the European Convention and the European Court of Human Rights and a speculative evaluation of the 1998 Human Rights Act. There is, as yet, very limited asylum case law that makes reference to the Human Rights Act, and the provisions necessary to give effect to section 65 of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act relating to Human Rights
have not yet been implemented. The final part of the paper explores some of the political constraints that impede the working of international law in relation to refuge and human rights.
Background to the British Case
Although Britain signed the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1954 almost four decades passed before a Bill brought it before Parliament.
This did not, of course, mean that refugee status was not granted in Britain, only that the process of granting it, or asylum, was not regulated by primary legislation. Describing
British asylum policy in mid-Victorian England, Bernard Porter wrote that 'this policy of asylum was maintained, not by law, but by the absence of laws ' (1979: 3) . Such a situation is to the advantage of government as it leaves room for a high degree of discretion and flexibility, leaving the government of the day free to choose who will be while asylum seekers are those whose claims have not yet been decided or who are appealing a negative decision.
admitted and who refused. To all intents and purposes, this remained the case until 1993
when Parliament passed the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act (although it could be argued that, in spite of certain decisions by the judiciary 2 , the British government retains its flexibility and discretion).
Until that time, people were granted refugee status under procedural Immigration Rules.
Until the late 1980s the annual number of asylum applicants did not exceed 5,000 and so there was little demand for legislation to regulate their acceptance, entitlements or integration. The Immigration Rules dealt primarily with entry and removal and it fell to the Secretary of State to determine refugee status. However, in spite of being incorporated into the rules, the Convention was not part of law and the rules were silent on procedures to establish whether a person was a refugee or not.
However, once asylum had been granted, refugees were usually given permission to remain for 12 months. Subsequently this could be extended by three years after which time they could apply for settlement (Macdonald 1995: 283) . The main distinction between refugees and asylum seekers at that time was in terms of security of residenceonce accepted as a refugee, one was generally free from the threat of removal; travel documents -with the issue of a refugee passport by the Home Office, one could leave and return to Britain; and the right to have their family come and join them.
In terms of welfare, both refugees and asylum seekers were entitled to social security benefits at the same level as British citizens and others with Leave to Remain. They had access to local authority housing, income support, education and healthcare, that is, most of the rights laid out in the 1951 Convention, though interpreted fairly narrowly.
In general, so long as the numbers were low, the costs to the public purse were lightly borne, and the Convention was more or less honoured, though it must be stressed always at the discretion of the Home Office. Even when crises meant unexpectedly (relatively) large numbers were allowed to enter, such as the Chileans (3,000 approx.), or the Vietnamese (18,638 -Kushner & Knox 1999: 312) . These groups were not seen as problematic since they were 'invited'. The numbers were limited and bounded since they came as part of government set quotas -they were seen as exceptional and therefore not a source of concern for the long-term.
The situation of the East African Asians in the late 1960s was peculiar because those people had British passports. They had lived in East Africa for generations as British
Commonwealth citizens and retained British Nationality following decolonisation.
However, they became targets during the process of 'Africanisation' as many of their businesses were taken over and they were forced to leave. Although they met some of the criteria of the Convention -they had a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of their nationality and race and had crossed international borders, the persecution was not by the state whose passports they held -Britain.
In theory they should have been able to claim the protection of the British state.
However, rather than honour international obligations according to the 1951 Convention or their duties to British citizens, the British government chose to withdraw the right of entry and settlement from that group by introducing the concept of patriality in the 1968
Commonwealth Immigrants Act: 'any citizen of Britain or its colonies who held a passport issued by the British government would be subject to immigration control unless they or at least one parent or grandparent was born, adopted, naturalised or registered in Britain as a citizen of Britain or its colonies' (Solomos 1993: 66) .
Nonetheless, some people managed to enter before the new law and others were susceptibility of domestic asylum administration to countervailing influences such as political expedience subsequently admitted as part of schemes that involved the resettlement of East African
Asians in Britain as well as other countries.
Incorporation of the 1951 Convention
During the early 1990s the situation changed and the response of the British state to asylum seekers and refugees moved much closer to its response to East African Asians than to the Chileans, or the Czechs and Hungarians before them. It was at this time that concerns begun to be expressed that Britain's asylum system was no longer adequate and suggestions for reform were put forward. This was partly because in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, the numbers of people seeking asylum in Britain increased. This trend is shown in Table 1 : In the light of a yearly increase up to 1991, Jeremy Corbyn, a left-wing Labour Party
MP, introduced a Bill that sought to incorporate the 1951 Convention and to clarify
Britain's obligations to asylum seekers and refugees. Unsurprisingly, given the Conservatives' hostility to immigration generally, and to asylum seekers in particular, the bill was thrown out. Instead, faced with increasing numbers of asylum seekers, the Conservative Government introduced another piece of legislation, the primary purpose of which was to deter applications for asylum. The 1992 General Election interrupted and foreign policy imperatives ' (1998: 33) .
the passage of the bill, but finally, and in spite of a decline in the numbers of applicants in 1992 and 1993 (Table 1 Why then give it greater force by including it in the bill? Part of the reason may be that since asylum practice was already largely in line with the Convention, its incorporation would make little difference. Since the Convention only applies to those recognised as refugees (with the exception of Art.33) it may be that it was hoped that its incorporation would soften liberal critics of a draconian bill. It was also clear that the Convention was a malleable instrument that could be and was interpreted to fit the needs and interests of the government of the day. The Convention was already widely cited and referred to in judgements and though successive Home Secretaries had been chastised for acting in breach of the spirit of the Convention, they had also successfully avoided having to go back on their decisions. Besides, if the bill served to reduce the number of asylum seekers -its ultimate goal -and hence the number of refugees who would be able to 3 The same pattern was evident during the passage of the 1996 Act, with numbers falling prior to its claim their rights under the Convention, any additional costs would be a price worth paying. If this was in fact the logic behind the bill, it proved to be a serious miscalculation. persecution (Nicholson 1996) . Applicants from such countries were only allowed access to an accelerated appeals procedure. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act capped that by introducing 'One Stop Appeals', designed to speed up the process.
Ironically therefore it can be argued that the situation of those requesting refugee recognition has deteriorated markedly in the period since the early 1990s. This is despite the incorporation of the 1951 Convention into British law.
New Labour, Human Rights and Refugees
What hope then should we pin on the Human Rights Act? Among the promises made by the Labour Party during the 1997 General Election campaign were two of enormous potential relevance to asylum-seekers:
 first that there would be a major overhaul of an asylum system that was a 'complete shambles'
 second that the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) would be incorporated into British law with the passage of a Human Rights
Act.
In 1998 the Human Rights Act, which specifies that no laws must be passed that contravene the ECHR, was passed. The review of the asylum system culminated in the The Aziz case came to court in the early 1980s as the then Home Secretary tried to introduce a law permitting only women with British citizenship and at least one parent with British citizenship to bring in their husbands. Until then, only men had the automatic right to bring in their spouses. The Court found that such a law would be in breach of Art.8, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life.
However, the government got round this by abolishing the automatic right for men and introducing the 'primary purpose rule', which did not allow entry to spouses for whom the primary purpose of the marriage was to effect entry to the UK. The ability of national governments to change the rules in order to evade international obligations should not be underestimated. We will return to this point below.
Nonetheless, it is anticipated that the HR Act will change law and practice in the UK.
New laws must be compatible with the ECHR and existing law will be open to reinterpretation, as UK courts will apply ECHR rights directly (Justice 1999 ). The 1999
Immigration and Asylum act took cognisance of these requirements and created a 'freestanding human rights appeal (S65(1)) and a human rights ground as an additional limb of an existing appeal (S65(3))' (JCWI 2001: 49) . While these subsections of the Act apparantly extend the right of appeal, in fact they are curtailed by sections 73-77, which introduce the 'one-stop' procedure, reducing the number of appeals in many cases to one inclusive appeal, during which the adjudicator will rule on all possible grounds for appeal. This applies to all kinds of migration cases, not just human rights or asylum.
Furthermore, large sections of the Act are exempt from the constraints of human rights considerations (such as support, detention, living conditions etc) since the human rights appeal is only available in relation to the appellant's right to enter and remain (JCWI:
2001: 50-1). and is less secure, since it is open to revision and withdrawal. It is to be hoped that the courts will not become even less likely to grant refugee status knowing that asylum seekers may now be protected by the Human Rights Act.
One of the concerns must be how many people will actually benefit from the cases that reach the courts. While refugee advocates and others point to the possibility that 'hundreds' may benefit from the recent Adan and Aitsegur 9 cases, similar assumptions arising out of Shah and Islam and Chahal have proved unfounded. By contrast, when the Law Lords have found against an appellant, as for example, Horvath 10 , this has been followed by the mass expulsion of the relevant group (in this case, Roma people from Slovakia).
Two other developments arising out of two different pieces of legislation give rise to further serious concern. The first is the exemption given to discrimination on the basis of 'ethnic group' from the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act. This Act, which is partly a direct response to concerns raised by the Macpherson Report into the death of
Stephen Lawrence, is designed to bring public bodies such as the police within the remit of the 1996 Race Relations Act. Originally, it had been decided that the immigration services would continue to be exempt (presumably since they cannot be other than discriminatory), but it was subsequently decided that discrimination on the basis of Given that the majority of asylum seekers are drawn from just these groups, it is clear that the purpose of this authorisation is simply the reduction of the numbers of people 10 In July 2000, Horvath appealed against the rejection of his asylum claim on the grounds that, as a Roma in Slovakia he was subject to persecution for reasons of the and that the Slovak government was unable or unwilling to protect him. Although it had been hoped that this test case would be resolved in favour of Horvath, it was rejected and in the weeks that followed the decision, the Home Office deported hundreds of Roma (Telephone Interview, Amanda Sebestyen, Europe-Roma, 30 May 2001). Given that most Roma find it difficult to get legal representation, it is likely that some of these were without appeal.
managing to make a claim 11 . Since most would be entitled to protection under the terms of both the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, the abandonment of humanitarian principles in relation to these groups is quite striking. 
Contradictions and Conflicts
The 1951 The challenge would be on the grounds that the group of people targeted are particularly vulnerable and that therefore this treatment is inhuman and degrading.
It seems as though the Human Rights Act is a step forward in terms of judicial review.
Previously it was very difficult to get judicial review, if one had a right of appeal from abroad. Before the Act, arguments that an appeal from abroad was impractical because someone was subject to inhuman or degrading treatment would be dismissed as the ECHR had no validity in British courts. However, the passage of the Human Rights Act means that judicial review has gone from extra-statutory to statutory footing -the Secretary of State must now make provision for judicial review as part of the process.
dependents), most of whom have come from Somalia. Convention significantly this must mean that it is doing its job.
Refuge and the Political Agenda
There are conflicts between the aspirations and norms embodied in the 1951
Convention and the ECHR and the asylum practice of Britain. This is inevitable, given the fundamentally different principles on which they are based -humanity versus the nation. The question then is how will these be resolved? Past experience teaches us that this will usually be in favour of governments. There are exceptions, but in general the judiciary upholds the decisions of the Home Office, e.g. Horvath. Where decisions go against governments, they simply change the rules -as in the case of Aziz.
Macdonald (1995: 293) has pointed out that praise for the Convention should be leavened with a degree of caution. As with all laws and treaties drafted by and signed up to by states, while they may embody universal ideals, woven into them are certain safeguards for states. It has been very difficult traditionally for individuals, firstly to bring a complaint, then to see it through what is inevitably a long, complicated and expensive process, with the result that the number of cases that have actually been successful are very few. This is not to suggest that hope should be abandoned. The efficacy of international law depends on the skill of lawyers, but -even more importantly -on the creation of a public climate in which it is not possible for states to brush aside their commitments and the creation of a polity that will hold them to account.
